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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium search and matching
model where an underground economy co-exists along with the formal
part of the economy. In analyzing how tax and punishment policies
a¤ect labour market performance, we nd that punishment of infor-
mal sector activities induce workers and rms to reallocate towards
the formal sector. However, more importantly, we nd that this real-
location tends to improve e¢ ciency in search, reduce the overall wage
pressure, and reduce actual unemployment.
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1 Introduction
There is a large interest in combatting the underground economy across the
industrialized world. Undeclared work will, among other things, deprive
countries from revenues needed in order to nance the provision of public
services. Estimates of the amount of undeclared work in the European union
amounts to between 7 and 16 percent of EUs GDP, which translates into
about 10 million to 28 million jobs.1 However, it is unclear if, and if so how,
undeclared work can be turned into declared work and thus into increased
government revenues. Will policies reducing underground job opportunities
really increase formal sector employment opportunities? However, if so is the
case, to what extent will formal sector jobs replace jobs in the underground
economy? Moreover, through what mechanisms will these policies a¤ect
the creation of jobs in the formal and the informal sector? To analyze the
full impact of combatting undeclared work requires a general equilibrium
framework.
In this paper we build an equilibrium search and matching model with an
informal sector. Workers will allocate their search for formal and informal
sector jobs optimally. Wages are set in wage negotiations between workers
and rms and unemployment features as an equilibrium outcome. To keep
the model simple and transparent, the di¤erences between the formal and the
informal sector are kept at a minimum. In fact, the only di¤erence between
the formal and the informal sector is that taxes are paid in the former and
a ne is paid upon detection in the latter. We also allow the separation rate
1See European commission COM/98/0219. The commission has also conducted the
rst EU wide cross-nationally comparable questionnaire to increase the knowledge about
tax evasion in Europe in order to combat it (see EC, 2007). Also the OECD stresses the
importance of combating tax evasion as it threatens government revenues, and has initiated
the "Global forum of transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes" (OECD,
2010).
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to be higher for informal sector workers than for formal sector workers, as
the former faces an additional probability of separation in case of detection.
The assumption of separation upon detection is however not important for
the results.
The model is used to analyze the impact of tax and punishment poli-
cies on labour market performance. We nd that increased punishment of
the informal sector induces a reallocation of rms and workers towards the
formal sector. While this is somewhat expected, it is less clear from an a
prior point of view, how wages and aggregate unemployment are a¤ected
by such policy. We nd that informal sector producer wages increase and
formal sector producer wages fall, and that unemployment most likely falls
with increased informal sector punishment. Thus, formal sector employment
increases by more than informal sector employment falls. This follows as
workers allocate too much time to search for informal sector jobs as these
jobs are untaxed. Thus, as rms and workers reallocate towards the for-
mal sector, search becomes more e¢ cient, aggregate wage pressure falls, and
aggregate job creation increases.
Early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where under-reporting of income is
modelled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent papers have en-
hanced the basic model of individual behavior by, for example, incorporating
endogenous labour supply decisions.2 Also equilibrium models with tax eva-
sion have been developed (for examples see the early study by Cremer and
Gahvari (1993) and the recent study by Tonin (2010)). These models of tax
evasion, however, features perfectly competitive labour markets. The princi-
pal contribution of the analyses in this paper is that we consider tax evasion
in a model featuring involuntary unemployment, which, in contrast to most
2See for example Sandmo (1981) for an early contribution of endogenous labour supply
and underreporting of income.
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previous work on tax evasion, enables us to study the impact of tax evasion
on wage formation and unemployment.
During the last decade, however, there have been some studies of un-
derground activity in models of involuntary unemployment; see Kolm and
Larsen (2005, 2006), Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), Fugazza and Jacques (2004)
and Albrecht et al (2009). The focus and modelling strategies are, however,
di¤erent in these papers.
The recent paper by Albrecht et al (2009) considers the impact of payroll
taxes and severance pay on unemployment in the presence of an informal
sector. Their informal sector is modelled from a Latin American perspective
where the informal sector is large and can be seen as an unregulated sector
which is not a¤ected by these policies. As their focus is not on the illegality
of this sector, punishment policies of informality are not modelled.
Previous studies investigating the impact of punishment policies of the
informal sector in models featuring equilibrium unemployment, assumes an
asymmetry across the informal and the formal sector in order to generate
coexistence of both sectors. The study by Kolm and Larsen (2006), for ex-
ample, explores the consequences of punishment policies on labour market
performance in an economy where the underground economy produces di¤er-
ent goods as compared to the formal part of the economy. The coexistence of
both a formal and an informal sector is generated only because workers like
to consume both types of goods. The studies by Kolm and Larsen (2005) and
Fugazza and Jacques (2004), on the other hand, explore the consequences for
unemployment when workers have moral considerations when deciding on in-
formal sector work. With workers being heterogenous with respect to moral,
only workers with low moral are willing to work in the informal sector. The
paper by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), also considers punishment policies in
a model of informal employment and involuntary unemployment. However,
in order to generate coexistence of both formal and informal jobs in their
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model, all jobs are started as legal jobs. Informal jobs come about as legal
rms are hit by a bad productivity shock and face the option of becoming
illegal.
The current paper, on the other hand, investigates the impact of tax and
punishment policies on labour market performance in an equilibrium search
and matching model where coexistence of both sectors is not based on an
exogenously imposed asymmetry across the two sectors.
2 The model3
This section considers a two sector general equilibriummodel featuring match-
ing frictions and worker-rm wage bargaining. Workers search for jobs both
in a formal sector and in an informal sector. The only di¤erence between
the two sectors are that the formal sector can be taxed whereas the informal
sector can not. Rather than taxing the informal sector, the government au-
dits the economy. With probability p a worker-rm pair in the underground
economy is detected and then has to pay a punishment fee.4
2.1 Matching
The matching function for the formal (F ) and the informal (I) sector respec-
tively are given by Xj = (vj)1 
 
(j)

u

; j = F; I; where Xj is the number
of matches, vj is the number of sectorial vacancies, and u is the number of
unemployed workers.
The unemployed workers allocate their search e¤ort optimally between
3The model is along the lines of Pissarides (2000).
4For realism one may also assume that the match is dissolved as a consequence of
detection. We introduce this feature in the model although no results depend on this. It
will, however, reinforce the impact of tax and punishment policies on unemployment. This
is discussed in the last section.
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the formal and the informal sector. On the job search is disregarded for
simplicity. Each workers total search intensity is exogenously given and
normalized to unity, where I =  denotes search e¤ort directed towards
the informal sector, and F = 1    denotes search e¤ort directed towards
the formal sector. The parameter  < 1 captures that the e¤ectiveness of
search falls with search e¤ort, i.e., the rst unit of search in one sector is
more e¤ective than the subsequent units of search. This could capture that
di¤erent search methods are used when searching for a job in a market. The
more time that is used in order to search in a market, the less e¢ cient search
methods have to be used. This particular modelling strategy of search e¤ort
has a close resemblance to how search is modelled in van den Berg and van
der Klaauw (2006), where search for a job can be conducted using di¤erent
search channels.
The transition rates into formal and informal sector employment for
a particular worker i, are Fi = (1  i)
 
F
1 
and Ii = 

i
 
I
1 
;
where F = v
F
(1 )u and 
I = v
I
u
are labour market tightness measured
in e¤ective search units. The rates at which vacant jobs become lled are
qj =
 
j
 
; j = F; I.
2.2 Value functions
Let U; EF , and EI denote the expected present values of unemployment, and
employment in the two sectors. The value functions for worker i then reads:
rUi = R + 
F
i (E
F   Ui) + Ii (EI   Ui); (1)
rEFi = R + w
F
i (1  t) + s(U   EFi ); (2)
rEIi = R + w
I
i (1  p) + (s+ p) (U   EIi ); (3)
where r is the exogenous discount rate, wj is the sector wage, and s is the
exogenous separation rate. R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals
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receive from the government which reects that the government has some
positive revenue requirements.5 The parameter t is the proportional income
tax rate, p captures the probability of being detected working in the informal
sector, and  is the proportion of the evaded income the worker has to pay as
a punishment fee if detected. For realism we here introduce the assumption
that the match is dissolved when detected. However, no results will depend
on this assumption. In fact, the only real implication of this assumption
is that the e¤ect of tax and punishment policies on unemployment is rein-
forced. A separate proposition is included to discuss the implications of this
assumption.
For simplicity, we disregard from unemployment benets.
Let JF and V F represent the expected present values of an occupied job
and a vacant job in the formal sector, respectively. The arbitrage equations
for a job paying the wage wFi and a vacant job in the formal sector are then
rJFi = y   wFi (1 + z) + s(V F   JFi ); (4)
rV F = qF (JF   V F )  k; (5)
where z is the payroll tax rate and y is productivity. Vacancy costs are
denoted k. Analogous notation for the informal sector yields:
rJ Ii = y   wIi (1 + p) + (s+ p) (V I   J Ii ); (6)
rV I = qI(J I   V I)  k; (7)
where  is the proportion of the evaded wage the rm has to pay as a pun-
ishment fee if detected.
The unemployed worker i allocates search, i, between the formal and
the informal sector in order to maximize the value of unemployment, rUi.
5Everyone receives this transfer. The government cannot exclude the informal sector
workers as the government does not know who the informal sector workers are (if it did,
it could just punish all of them).
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A necessary condition for an interior solution is that  < 1, which holds by
assumption. The rst order condition can be written as:
(1  i)1 
(i)
1  =

F
I
1 
EF   Ui
EI   Ui : (8)
Workers allocate their search between the formal and the informal sector
so to equalize the net returns to search e¤ort across the two sectors.
2.3 Wage determination
When a worker and rm meet, they bargain over the wage, wji , taking econ-
omy wide variables as given. The rst order conditions from the Nash bar-
gaining solutions, with the workers bargaining power being equal to , can
be written:

1  
1
F
JF = EF   U; (9)

1  
1
I
J I = EI   U; (10)
where F = 1+z
1 t and 
I = 1+p
1 p are the tax and punishment wedges, and
where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry condition, V j = 0,
j = F; I.
We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated be-
tween the two sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by substituting (9) and
(10) into (8) and using that JF = k
qF
and J I = k
qI
from (5) and (7) together
with free entry. This yields the following core equation:
(1  )1 
()1 
=
F
I
 ; (11)
where
 =
I
F
=
1 + p
1  p =
1 + z
1  t ; (12)
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is the wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. We can
interpret a  < 1 as if the informal sector is punished to a lesser extent than
the formal sector is taxed.6
Recall from (8) that workers allocate their search between sectors so that
the marginal net returns to search are equal in the two sectors. With wages
being endogenously determined in equilibrium, this corresponds to account
for the wedge,  , and for di¤erences in sectorial labour market tightness,
F
I
, when deciding where to allocate search. For example, if the informal
sector is punished to a lesser extent than the formal sector is taxed,  < 1;
unemployed workers tend to direct more search into the informal sector. And,
on the other hand, the relatively tighter the formal sector is, the larger formal
sector search tends to be.
By use of equation (1)-(7) and (11) in equations (9) and (10), equilibrium
producer wages, !j; j = F; I, are given by:
!F = wF (1 + z) = 

y + k
F
(1  )1 

; (13)
!I = wI (1 + p) = 

y + k
I
1 

: (14)
Wages increase with labour market tightness and decrease with search
intensity in each sector. This follows as a higher labour market tightness
and a lower search intensity improve the workers bargaining position. An
increase in tightness makes it easier for a worker to nd a job in case of job
loss, and at the same time harder for a rm to ll a vacancy. This improves
the workers relative bargaining position, resulting in higher wage demands.
The opposite holds when search increases as then rms will nd it easier to
6In contrast, if  = 1, the informal sector is punished equally hard as the formal sector
is taxed. With risk neutral individuals there is, in one sense, no substantial di¤erence
between the tax system and the punishment system since the punishment system is a
randomized tax system.
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match with a new worker in case of no agreement, and at the same time
harder for workers to nd a vacancy. Higher search e¤ort into a sector then
reduces the workers relative bargaining position, resulting in lower wage
demands.
From (13), (14) together with (11) it follows that producer wages in the
formal sector exceed informal sector producer wages when  < 1, and vice
versa when  > 1. Moreover, rewriting (13) and (14) in terms of consumer
wages we have that consumer wages in the formal sector are lower than
informal sector consumer wages when  < 1, and vice versa when  >
1. More specically we have !F   !I = kF
(1 )1  (1   ) and wF (1  t)  
wI (1  p) = y
I
(   1).
2.4 Labour market tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are
determined by equation (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition
and the wage equations (13) and (14):
k (r + s)
 
F

= (1  ) y   k
F
(1  )1  ; (15)
k (r + s+ p)
 
I

= (1  ) y   k
I
1 
: (16)
When  < 1, which can be considered to be the most realistic case, the
informal sector is punished to a lesser extent than the formal sector is taxed.
In this case, informal producer wages are lower than formal producer wages
and hence the expected instantaneous prots in the informal sector exceed
the instantaneous prots in the formal sector.7 This makes it more attractive
for rms to enter the informal sector which tends to make informal tightness
7The right-hand side of equations (15) and (16), are simply the instantaneous prots,
i.e., F = ym   !Fm and I = ym   !Im, where we from the previous section know that
!F   !I = kF(1 ) (1   ) :
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exceed formal tightness, i.e., tends to raise I relatively to F . However, if
the separation rate in the formal sector is lower, s < s+ p, which it is if the
match is dissolved upon detection, the formal sector expected job duration
is longer. The formal sector then, in this case, becomes more attractive to
enter, tending to reduce I relatively to F . Consequently, it is possible
to have F > I , although  < 1. As discussed in section 2.2, di¤erent
separation rates have no implications for the results.
2.5 Unemployment
The employment rates for workers in the formal sector and the informal
sector, nF ; nI , and the unemployment rate, u; are determined by the ow
equilibrium, Iu = (s+ p)nI ; Fu = snF ; and the labour force identity,
nF + nI = 1   u. The o¢ cial unemployment rate for manual workers uo; is
given by uo = u+ nI . Solving for the employment and unemployment rates
yield:
nI =
I
s+p
1 + 
I
s+p
+ 
F
s
; nF =
F
s
1 + 
I
s+p
+ 
F
s
; (17)
u =
1
1 + 
I
s+p
+ 
F
s
; uo =
1 + 
I
s+p
1 + 
I
s+p
+ 
F
s
: (18)
Note that as observable unemployment includes the informal sector work-
ers too, an increase in the transition rate into the informal sector increases
the o¢ cial unemployment rate, whereas the actual one falls.
3 Comparative statics
This section is concerned with the impact of the tax and punishment system
on the allocation of search e¤ort and rm activity across the formal and the
informal sector, as well as the e¤ect on aggregate unemployment. The proofs
11
of all propositions follow from straightforward comparative statics and are
available upon request.
We consider fully nanced changes in the punishment rates. Hence,
changes in the punishment rates,  or , are always followed by adjustments
in the tax rates, z or t, so as to balance the government budget restriction.
The government budget restriction is given by:
nF!F

1  1
F

+ nI!I(1  1
I
)   (p) = R; (19)
where R is the exogenous revenue requirements and  (p) is auditing costs.8
3.1 Wage formation and sector allocation
The e¤ects on search e¤ort and wage formation are summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 1 A fully nanced increase in a punishment rate ( or ) will
reallocate search intensity towards the formal sector ( falls). Furthermore,
it will increase the producer wage in the informal sector (!I) and reduce the
producer wage in the formal sector (!F ).
When underground activity is punished more severely, unemployed work-
ers will nd it optimal to reallocate their search e¤ort towards the formal
8To tax (punish) the rm side or the worker side is equivalent for ; F ; I ; nF ; nI ; u,
uo, as t, z, , , does not appear in (19) and (17),(11),(15),(16),(18) other than through
F and I . From (19) it follows that any R can be attained by increasing F and I
simultaneously so to keep  constant. Also, as only  a¤ects the variables, the e¤ects of
fully nanced reforms can be considered by only looking at changes in  . For example,
consider a fully nanced increase in . If  and t increases (reduces) R, the higher 
induce a surplus (decit) which calls for a reduction (increase) in t so to balance the
budget.  increases with both the changes in  and t. If  a¤ects R di¤erently from t,  
can either be increased by a smaller reduction in  compared to t, or by a larger increase
in  compared to t.
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sector. However, when search is reallocated towards the formal sector, wage
pressure in the formal sector falls whereas wage pressure in the informal sec-
tor increases. Workers increased search for formal sector jobs reduce the
workersrelative bargaining position which restrains formal wage demands.
In contrast, the reduced search in the informal sector strengthens workers
relative bargaining position in the informal sector inducing informal wages
to increase.
In addition, let the e¤ects on tightness and sector employment be sum-
marized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A fully nanced increase in the punishment rates ( or )
will increase tightness and employment in the formal sector (F ; nF ) and
reduce tightness and employment in the informal sector (I ; nI).
As the producer wage facing informal rms tends to increase, whereas
the formal producer wage tends to fall, rms incentives to enter the for-
mal sector instead of the informal sector increase; formal sector tightness
increases whereas informal sector tightness falls. As formal sector tightness
raises relative to tightness in the informal sector, search is further reallocated
towards the formal sector. This e¤ect becomes smaller and smaller until the
new equilibrium is reached.
From the results presented so far, we obtain the expected result that
increased punishment of the informal sector induces a reallocation of workers
from the informal sector towards the formal sector. This is a consequence
of that both vacancies and search e¤ort is reallocated towards the formal
sector; the job o¤er arrival rate for formal sector jobs increases, whereas it
falls for informal sector jobs. However, the reallocation of search towards
the formal sector also leads to increased informal sector wages and reduced
formal sector wages.
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3.2 Unemployment
We summarize the results of how the tax and punishment rates a¤ect unem-
ployment in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 A fully nanced increase in the punishment rate ( or )
will always reduce o¢ cial unemployment (uo). Actual unemployment (u)
falls with a fully nanced increase in the punishment rate ( or ) if  < 1.
It is a prior not clear what would happen to aggregate unemployment. It
turns out that the increase in formal sector employment more than outweighs
the fall in informal sector employment as long as formal sector taxation
exceeds informal sector punishment, i.e., if  < 1. Thus unemployment falls
with increased punishment of the informal sector in this case.
The reason why unemployment falls with increased punishment is that
search becomes more e¢ ciently allocated when redirected towards the formal
sector in the case when  < 1. With  < 1, attractive untaxed job opportu-
nities in the informal sector induce workers to search too much for informal
jobs. With decreasing returns to search in a sector, total search e¢ ciency
then improves when search is reallocated towards the formal sector in this
case.
The fact that search becomes more e¢ cient when reallocated towards the
formal sector also has an impact on unemployment working through wage
formation and tightness. As search is reallocated towards the formal sector,
the wage demand is moderated in the formal sector and exaggerated in the
informal sector. As search e¢ ciency in the formal sector increases more
than search e¢ ciency in the informal sector is reduced, the formal sector
wage moderation will dominate the informal sector wage push. Thus, the
incentives to open up a vacancy in the formal sector exceeds the disincentives
to open up a vacancy in the informal sector; formal sector tightness will
increase by more than informal sector tightness falls when  < 1.
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To sum up, an increased punishment of the informal sector tends to in-
crease total search e¢ ciency, moderate overall wages and increase total tight-
ness if  < 1. This implies that the increase in formal sector employment
exceeds the reduction in informal sector employment; unemployment falls.
None of the results derived in this paper hinges on the assumption that
the match is dissolved upon detection. However, by assuming that matches
dissolve upon detection, the negative impact of higher informal punishment
on unemployment is further reinforced. This follows as workers are real-
located towards the formal sector where jobs on average last a longer time.
This also implies that unemployment is reduced as a consequence of increased
punishment of the informal sector even if  exceeds unity. However, if  > 1,
that is the informal sector punishment exceeds the formal sector taxation,
further punishment of the informal sector has an ambiguous e¤ect on unem-
ployment. Unemployment tends to increase as total search e¢ ciency then
falls although unemployment tends to fall as formal sector jobs on average
have a longer duration. The results following the assumption of dissolvement
of the match upon detection is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Given a match is dissolved upon detection, a su¢ cient con-
dition for actual unemployment (u) to fall with a fully nanced increase in
the punishment rate ( or ) is   1.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated if, and to what extent, undeclared work could be
turned into declared work and higher government revenues by a more sever
punishment of the underground economy. Moreover, we analyzed through
which channels these policies a¤ected the creation of jobs in the formal and
the informal sector.
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To o¤er a proper investigation we built a general equilibrium search and
matching model with an informal sector, where the coexistence of both sec-
tors were not based on an exogenously imposed asymmetry across the two
sectors. Workers allocated their search for formal and informal sector jobs
optimally and wages were set through wage negotiations between workers
and rms. In order to focus on the mere impact of tax evasion, the only
di¤erence between the formal and the informal sector was that taxes were
paid in the former and a ne was paid upon detection in the latter. We did
allow for an additional probability of separation in case of detection in the
informal sector but this assumption was of no importance for the results.
We showed that increased punishment of the informal sector induced a
reallocation of rms and workers towards the formal sector. Informal sector
producer wages increased whereas formal sector producer wages fell. Unem-
ployment was reduced if the government was unable to audit and punish the
informal sector to the same extent as it could tax the formal sector. Thus,
formal sector employment increased by more than informal sector employ-
ment fell. This was a consequence of that workers allocated too much time
to search for informal sector jobs as these jobs were untaxed. Thus, the
reallocation towards the formal sector improved search e¢ ciency, reduced
aggregate wage pressure, and increased total job creation.
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